

Lattice Algorithms: Design, Analysis and Experiments

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


March 2017



Warning

- **Interaction**: please ask questions during my talks; interruptions are welcome.
- **Slides will be available online.**
- If you really want to understand an algorithm, it is helpful to implement it, using sage or NTL.



The Ubiquity of Lattices

- In mathematics
 - Algebraic number theory, Algebraic geometry, Sphere packings, etc.
 - Fields medals: G. Margulis (1978), E. Lindenstrauss and S. Smirnov (2010), M. Bhargava (2014).
- Applications in computer science, statistical physics, etc.

Motivation

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Motivation

- Many people want **convincing security estimates** for lattice-based cryptosystems (and other post-quantum cryposystems).
- Use numerical challenges as a **sanity check** of the state-of-the-art.

NTRU Challenges (2015-)



Solved Challenges

Congrats to our winners!

Challenge #1 107r0 - Nick H.

Challenge #2 113r0 - Nick H.

Challenge #3 131r1 - Léo D., and Phong Q. N.

Challenge #4 139r1 - Léo D., and Phong Q. N.


Challenge #5 149r1 - Léo D., and Phong Q. N.

Challenge #6 163r1 - Léo D., and Phong Q. N.

Challenge #7 173r1 - Léo D., and Phong Q. N.

- o Method used in largest records: Enumeration with BKZ.

Darmstadt Lattice Challenge (2008-)



INTRODUCTION

Welcome to the lattice challenge.

Building upon a previous paper by Ajtai [1], we have constructed lattice homomorphisms of \mathbb{Z}^n onto a subset of \mathbb{Z}^m in all lattices of a certain smaller dimension. We know that one can solve all instances efficiently, but rather than use the worst case instances, we pick those lattice bases and hard instances of \mathbb{Z}^n and combine modern lattice reduction algorithms.

We show how these lattice bases were constructed and prove the existence of each of the corresponding lattices in \mathbb{Z}^m . We challenge everyone to try whether a short vector. There are two ways to enter the hall of fame:

1. Find a shortest nonzero vector that is nearly as short as before.
2. Find an even shorter vector in one of the dimensions listed in the hall of fame.

References

1. Ajtai, Generating hard instances of lattice problems, STOC 1983
2. Buchhorn, Lattice Reduction: Exact Hard Instances of the Shortest Vectors Problem

HALL OF FAME

Position	Dimension	Shortest vector	Contributor
1	600	117.04	Yuhong Guo, Phong Qiu
2	600	111.00	Yuhong Guo, Phong Qiu
3	576	100.14	Yuhong Guo, Phong Qiu
4	576	97.74	Yuhong Guo, Phong Qiu
5	528	88.00	Yuhong Guo, Phong Qiu

- o Method used in largest records: Enumeration with BKZ.

Darmstadt SVP Challenge (2010-)


Position	Dimension	Vertices	Area	Description	Solution	Algorithm
1	100	3200	0	Large SVP Challenge and Solution TSP100	100	Other
2	100	3276	0	Large SVP Challenge and Solution TSP100	100	Other
3	100	3290	0	Large SVP Challenge and Solution TSP100	100	Other
4	100	3340	0	Large SVP Challenge and Solution TSP100	100	Other
5	100	3360	0	Large SVP Challenge and Solution TSP100	100	Other
6	100	3370	0	Large SVP Challenge and Solution TSP100	100	Other
7	100	3377	0	Large SVP Challenge and Solution TSP100	100	Other
8	100	3476	0	Large SVP Challenge and Solution TSP100	100	Other
9	100	3533	0	Large SVP Challenge and Solution TSP100	100	Other
10	100	3600	0	Solution Area and Pring System	100	SDP, BIC
11	100	3620	0	Large SVP Challenge and Solution TSP100	100	Other
12	100	3660	0	Large SVP Challenge and Solution TSP100	100	Other
13	100	3690	0	Large SVP Challenge and Solution TSP100	100	Other
14	100	3695	0	Solution Area and Pring System	100	SDP, BIC
15	100	3807	0	Large SVP Challenge and Solution TSP100	100	Other
16	100	3900	0	Solution Area	100	SDP, BIC
17	100	3960	0	Large SVP Challenge and Solution TSP100	100	Other
18	100	3960	60	Solution Area and Pring System	100	SDP, BIC
19	100	3960	60	Solution Area and Pring System	100	SDP, BIC

o Method used in largest records?

The SVP Challenges

Number of core-days

Enumeration RSR



Dimension



Comparison with RSA Records

- The largest SVP-computation is for dim 150 (Jan. 2017): 340,000 core-days $\approx 2^{66}$ clock cycles.
- This is **only half** RSA-768 = 730,000 core-days $\approx 2^{67}$ clock cycles.

Goal

- Understand the main ideas and underlying the best lattice algorithms in practice.
- Understand their limitations.

Trends

- Imbalance: much more publications on the design of lattice-based cryptographic schemes than lattice algorithms.
- The literature on lattice algorithms can be confusing:
 - Provable \neq heuristic
 - Worst-case analysis \neq typical behaviour
 - Sometimes, incorrect statements




Summary

- Mathematical background
- Enumeration
 - Cylinder pruning
 - Discrete pruning
- Algorithms from Hermite's constant
 - LLL and Hermite's inequality
 - Block-wise algorithms and Mordell's inequality
 - Mordell's proof of Minkowski's inequality
- Security Estimates

Overview

- The biggest distinction among lattice algorithms is space:
 - Poly-space algorithms
 - Exp-space algorithms




Mathematical Background

What is a Lattice?

- A **lattice** is a discrete subgroup of \mathbf{R}^n , or the set $L(b_1, \dots, b_d)$ of all linear combinations $\sum x_i b_i$ where $x_i \in \mathbf{Z}$, and the b_i 's are linearly independent.


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0	2	0	0	0
0	0	2	0	0
0	0	0	2	0
1	1	1	1	1





Integer Lattices


- A (full-rank) **integer lattice** is any subgroup L of $(\mathbf{Z}^n, +)$ s.t. \mathbf{Z}^n/L is finite.



- A lattice is **infinite**, but lattice crypto implicitly uses the **finite abelian group** \mathbf{Z}^n/L : it works modulo the lattice L .

Lattice Invariants

- The **dim** is the dim of $\text{span}(L)$.
- The **(co-)volume** is the volume of any basis parallelepiped: can be computed in poly-time. Ex: $\text{vol}(\mathbf{Z}^n)=1$.






The Gaussian Heuristic

- The volume measures the **density** of lattice points.
- For “**nice**” full-rank lattices L , and “**nice**” measurable sets C of \mathbb{R}^n :

$$\text{Card}(L \cap C) \approx \frac{\text{vol}(C)}{\text{vol}(L)}$$




Volume of the Ball

The n -dimensional volume of a Euclidean ball of radius R in n -dimensional Euclidean space is:

$$V_n(R) = \frac{\pi^{\frac{n}{2}}}{\Gamma\left(\frac{n}{2} + 1\right)} R^n,$$

$$\Gamma(z) = \int_0^{\infty} x^{z-1} e^{-x} dx$$

Short Lattice Vectors



- Th: Any d -dim lattice L has **exponentially many** vectors of norm \leq

$$O\left(\sqrt{d}\right) \text{vol}(L)^{1/d}$$

- Th: In a **random** d -dim lattice L , all non-zero vectors have norm \geq

$$\Omega\left(\sqrt{d}\right) \text{vol}(L)^{1/d}$$



Hermite's Constant (1850)

- This is the “**worst-case**” for short lattice vectors.
- Hermite showed the existence of this constant:

$$\sqrt{\gamma_d} = \max_L \frac{\lambda_1(L)}{\text{vol}(L)^{1/d}}$$

- Here, $\lambda_1(L)$ is the minimal norm of a non-zero lattice vector.

Facts on Hermite's Constant



- Hermite's constant is asymptotically **linear**:

$$\Omega(n) \leq \gamma_n \leq O(n)$$


- The exact value of the constant is only known up to dim 8, and in dim 24 [2004].

dim n	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	24
γ_n	$2/\sqrt{3}$	$2^{1/3}$	$\sqrt{2}$	$8^{1/5}$	$(64/3)^{1/6}$	$64^{1/7}$	2	4
approx	1.16	1.26	1.41	1.52	1.67	1.81	2	4




Mathematical Goals

- Classical setting: the worst case.
 - Find the exact value of Hermite's constant.
- New trends: the average case.
 - Properties of random lattices, developing results from the 50s.
 - Properties of random lattice points



Overview of Lattice Algorithms

Lattice Algorithms



- Input = **integer matrix**, whose rows span the lattice. Parameters:
 - Size of basis coefficients
 - Lattice dimension
- Asymptotically:
 - dim increases
 - coeff-size polynomial in dim.

Hard Lattice Problems

○ Since 1996, lattices are **very trendy** in classical and quantum complexity theory.

○ Depending on the dimension d : approx. factor

○ NP-hardness

$$O(1)$$

$$1$$

○ non NP-hardness (NP_{nc} -NP)

$$\sqrt{d}$$

○ worst-case/average-case reduction

$$d \log d$$

○ cryptography


$$d^{O(1)}$$

○ **subexp-time** algorithms

$$2^{\sqrt{d}}$$

○ **poly-time** algorithms

$$2^{\frac{d \log \log d}{\log d}}$$



Generic Lattice Problem

- Input: a lattice L and a ball C
- Output: decide if $L \cap C$ is non-trivial, and if it is, find a non-trivial point.
- Settings
 - Approx: $L \cap C$ has many points. Ex: SIS and ISIS.
 - Unique: essentially, L has one non-trivial point, even though C might be small.

The Shortest Vector Problem (SVP)

- Input: a basis of a d -dim lattice L
- Output: nonzero $v \in L$ minimizing $\|v\|$ i.e.

$$\|v\| = \lambda_1(L)$$




2	0	0	0	0
0	2	0	0	0
0	0	2	0	0
0	0	0	2	0
1	1	1	1	1



Relaxing SVP

- Input: a basis of a d -dim lattice L .
- Output: nonzero $v \in L$ such that
- **Approximate-SVP**: $\|v\| \leq f(d) \lambda_1(L)$ [relative]



- **Hermite-SVP**: $\|v\| \leq g(d) \text{vol}(L)^{1/d}$ [absolute]

The Closest Vector Problem (CVP)

- Input: a basis of a lattice L of dim d , and a target vector t .
- Output: $v \in L$ minimizing $\|v - t\|$.



- **BDD** (bounded distance decoding): special case when t is very close to L .



Insight

- The most classical problem is to prove the existence of short lattice vectors.
- All known upper bounds on Hermite's constant have an algorithmic analogue:
 - Hermite's inequality: the LLL algorithm.
 - Mordell's inequality: Blockwise generalizations of LLL.
 - Mordell's proof of Minkowski's inequality: worst-case to average-case reductions for SIS and sieve algorithms [BJN14,ADRS15]

Hermite's
Inequality
and LLL





Hermite's Inequality

- Hermite proved in 1850:

$$\gamma_d \leq \gamma_2^{d-1} = \left(\frac{4}{3}\right)^{(d-1)/2}$$

- [LLL82] finds in polynomial time a non-zero lattice vector of norm $\leq (4/3 + \varepsilon)^{(d-1)/4} \text{vol}(L)^{1/d}$.

It is an algorithmic version of Hermite's inequality.

Proof of Hermite's Inequality

- Induction over d : obvious for $d=1$.
- Let b_1 be a shortest vector of L , and π the projection over b_1^\perp .
- Let $\pi(b_2)$ be a shortest vector of $\pi(L)$.
- We can make sure by lifting that:
$$\|b_2\|^2 \leq \|\pi(b_2)\|^2 + \|b_1\|^2/4 \quad (\text{size-reduction})$$
- On the other hand, $\|b_1\| \leq \|b_2\|$ and
$$\text{vol}(\pi(L)) = \text{vol}(L) / \|b_1\|.$$

Question

- Is the proof constructive?
- Does it build a non-zero lattice vector satisfying Hermite's inequality:

$$\|\vec{b}_1\| \leq \left(\frac{4}{3}\right)^{(d-1)/4} \text{vol}(L)^{1/d}$$

An Algorithmic Proof

- Let b_1 be a primitive vector of L , and π the projection over b_1^\perp .
- Find recursively $\pi(b_2) \in \pi(L)$ satisfying Hermite's inequality.
- Size-reduce so that $\|b_2\|^2 \leq \|\pi(b_2)\|^2 + \|b_1\|^2/4$
- If $\|b_2\| < \|b_1\|$, swap(b_1, b_2) and restart, otherwise stop.

An Algorithmic Proof

- This algorithm will terminate and output a non-zero lattice vector satisfying Hermite's inequality:

$$\|\vec{b}_1\| \leq \left(\frac{4}{3}\right)^{(d-1)/4} \text{vol}(L)^{1/d}$$

- But it may not be efficient: LLL does better by strengthening the test $\|b_2\| < \|b_1\|$.

Recursive LLL

- Input: (b_1, b_2, \dots, b_d) basis of L and $\varepsilon > 0$.
- LLL-reduce $(\pi(b_2), \dots, \pi(b_d))$ where π is the projection over b_1^\perp .
- Size-reduce so that $\|b_i\|^2 \leq \|\pi(b_i)\|^2 + \|b_1\|^2/4$
- If $\|b_2\| \leq (1 - \varepsilon) \|b_1\|$, swap(b_1, b_2) and restart, otherwise stop.



Take Away

- Hermite's inequality and LLL are based on two key ideas:
 - Projection
 - Lifting projected vectors aka size-reduction.



1773



1850

1982



LLL in Practice


The Magic of LLL

- One of the main reasons behind the popularity of LLL is that it performs “**much better**” than what the worst-case bounds suggest, especially in low dimension.
- This is another example of worst-case vs. “average-case”.

LLL: Theory vs Practice

- The approx factors $(4/3+\varepsilon)^{(d-1)/4}$ is **tight in the worst case**: but this is only for worst-case bases of certain lattices.
- Experimentally, $4/3+\varepsilon \approx 1.33$ can be replaced by a **smaller constant** ≈ 1.08 , **for any lattice**, by randomizing the input basis.
- But there is **no good explanation** for this phenomenon, and no known formula for the experimental constant ≈ 1.08 .

Illustration



Log(Hermite Factor)

Random Bases

- There is no natural probability space over the infinite set of bases.
- Folklore: generate a « random » unimodular matrix and multiply by a fixed basis. But distribution not so good.
- Better method:
 - Generate say $n+20$ random long lattice points
 - Extract a basis, e.g. using LLL.


Random LLL


- Surprisingly, [KiVe16] showed that most LLL bases of a random lattice have a $\|b_1\|$ close to the worst case. Note: in fixed dimension, the number of LLL bases can be bounded, independently of the lattice.
- This means that LLL biases the output distribution.

Open problem

- Take a random integer lattice L .
- Let B be the Hermite normal form of L , or a « random » basis from the discrete Gaussian distribution.
- Is it true that with overwhelming probability, after LLL-reducing B , $\|b_1\| \leq c^{d-1} \text{vol}(L)^{1/d}$ for some $c < (4/3)^{1/4}$?

Mordell's Inequality and Blockwise Algorithms






Divide and Conquer



- LLL is based on a local reduction in dim 2.
- Blockwise algorithms find **shorter vectors** than LLL by using an « exact » SVP-subroutine in low dim k called **blocksize**.
- Even if the subroutine takes exponential time in k , **this is poly in d** if $k = \log d$.



Mordell's Inequality

- If we show the existence of very short lattice vectors in dim k , can we prove the existence of very short lattice vectors in dim $d > k$?
- [Mordell1944]'s inequality generalizes Hermite's inequality:

$$\sqrt{\gamma_d} \leq \sqrt{\gamma_k}^{(d-1)/(k-1)}$$

$$\lambda_1(L) \leq \sqrt{\gamma_k}^{(d-1)/(k-1)} \text{vol}(L)^{1/d}$$

Approximation Algorithms for SVP

- Related to upper bounds on **Hermite's constant**, i.e. proving the existence of short lattice vectors.

- [LLL82] corresponds to [Hermite1850]'s inequality.

$$\|L\| \leq \left(\frac{4}{3}\right)^{(d-1)/4} \text{vol}(L)^{1/d} = \sqrt{\gamma_2}^{d-1} \text{vol}(L)^{1/d}$$

- Blockwise algorithms [Schnorr87, GHKN06, **GamaN08**, MiWa16] are related to

$$\|L\| \leq \sqrt{\gamma_k}^{(d-1)/(k-1)} \text{vol}(L)^{1/d}$$

Achieving Mordell's Inequality

- All blockwise algorithms reaching Mordell's inequality use duality, which provides a different way of reducing the dimension.
 - Let v be a non-zero vector in the dual lattice L^\times .
 - Then $L \cap v^\perp$ is a lattice of dimension $d-1$.

What is BKZ?

- Among all blockwise algorithms, BKZ is the **simplest**, and seems to be the best in practice, though its bound is a bit worse than Mordell's inequality.
- Blockwise algorithms have different worst-case bounds, but in high blocksize, there may not be much differences in practice.

Description of BKZ

- LLL-reduce the basis
- $i = 1$
- While some block is not reduced
 - Find the shortest vector in the k -block starting at index i .
 - If it is shorter than b_i^* : insert the new vector and run LLL to obtain a new basis.

Output of BKZ

- A basis output by BKZ is such that:
 - It is LLL-reduced
 - For each i , b_i^* is a (or near-) shortest vector in the k -block $(\pi_i(b_i), \pi_i(b_{i+1}), \dots, \pi_i(b_{\min(d, i+k-1)}))$

Algorithms
from
Minkowski's
Inequality





Short Lattice Vectors: Minkowski's Inequality

- [Minkowski]: Any d -dim lattice L has at least one non-zero vector of norm \leq

$$2 \frac{\Gamma(1 + d/2)^{1/d}}{\sqrt{\pi}} \operatorname{covol}(L)^{1/d} \leq \sqrt{d} \operatorname{covol}(L)^{1/d}$$

- This is **Minkowski's inequality** on Hermite's constant:

$$\sqrt{\gamma_d} \leq \frac{2}{v_d^{1/d}} = 2 \frac{\Gamma(1 + \frac{d}{2})^{1/d}}{\sqrt{\pi}} \leq \sqrt{d}$$

Four Proofs of Minkowski's Inequality



- Blichfeldt's proof: «continuous» pigeon-hole principle.



- Minkowski's original proof: sphere packings.
- Siegel's proof: Poisson summation.
- Mordell's proof: pigeon-hole principle.

Mordell's
Proof
(1933)






Remember Blichfeldt's Proof

- The short lattice vector is some $u-v$ where $u, v \in F$ for a well-chosen convex (**infinite**) set F .
- Mordell's proof uses a **finite** F .



Mordell's Proof (1933)

- For $q \in \mathbf{N}$, let $\bar{L} = q^{-1}L$ then $[\bar{L}:L] = q^d$.
Among $> q^d$ points v_1, \dots, v_m in \bar{L} , $\exists i \neq j$ s.t. $v_i - v_j \in L$.
- There are enough points in a **large ball** of radius r (r is close to Minkowski's bound in L , but large for \bar{L})



- We obtain a **short non-zero** point in L : $\text{norm} \leq 2r$.



Key Point

- Mordell proved the existence of short lattice vectors by using the existence of short vectors in a **special** class of **higher-dimensional integer** lattices.
 - Let distinct $v_1, \dots, v_m \in \bar{L} = q^{-1}L$.
 - Consider the integer lattice L' formed by all $(x_1, \dots, x_m) \in \mathbf{Z}^m$ s.t. $\sum_i x_i v_i \in L$.
 - If $m > q^d$, $\lambda_1(L') \leq \sqrt{2}$.



An Algorithm From Mordell's Proof

- Mordell's proof gives an (**inefficient**) algorithm:
 - Need to generate $>q^d$ lattice points in \bar{L} .
 - Among these exponentially many lattice points, find a difference in L , possibly by **exhaustive search**.
 - Both steps are expensive.
- [BGJ14] and [ADRS15] are more efficient randomized variants of Mordell's algorithm: sampling over \bar{L} may allow to sample over L .

Sieve algorithms [AKS01, ADRS15]

- Initially, generate long random vectors.
- Using sieving, reduce iteratively the « average » norm of the distribution.
- After a while, the shortest vector can be extracted: the running time is $2^{O(d)}$.
- [ADRS15] uses the discrete Gaussian distribution and $\bar{L}=L/2$.
- [BGJ14] is somewhat a more efficient heuristic version of [ADRS15], by using a pool of vectors.



Wishful Thinking

- To apply the pigeon-hole principle, we need an exponential number m of lattice vectors in \bar{L} .
- Can we get away with a **small polynomial number m** and make the algorithm efficient? (unlike [BGJ14] and [ADRS15])
 - Maybe if we could find short vectors in certain higher-dimensional random lattices.



Worst-case to Average-case
Reductions
from Mordell's Proof



The SIS Problem (1996): Small Integer Solutions

- Let $(G,+)$ be a finite Abelian group: $G=(\mathbf{Z}/q\mathbf{Z})^n$ in [Ajtai96]. View G as a \mathbf{Z} -module.
- Pick g_1, \dots, g_m uniformly at random from G .
- Goal: Find short $(x_1, \dots, x_m) \in \mathbf{Z}^m$ s.t. $\sum_i x_i g_i = 0$,
e.g. $\|x\| \leq m (\#G)^{1/m}$.
- This is essentially finding a short vector in a (uniform) **random lattice** of $L_m(G) = \{ \text{lattices } L \subseteq \mathbf{Z}^m \text{ s.t. } \mathbf{Z}^m/L \sim G \}$.



Ex: Cyclic G

- Let $G = \mathbf{Z}/q\mathbf{Z}$
- Pick g_1, \dots, g_m uniformly at random mod q .
- Goal: Find short $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_m) \in \mathbf{Z}^m$
s.t. $\sum_i x_i g_i \equiv 0 \pmod{q}$.



Worst-case to Average-case Reduction

- [Ajtai96]: If one can efficiently solve SIS for $G=(\mathbf{Z}/q_n\mathbf{Z})^n$ on the average, then one can efficiently find short vectors in **every n -dim** lattice.
- [GINX16]: This can be generalized to any sequence (G_n) of finite abelian groups, provided that **$\#G_n$ is sufficiently large**
 $\geq n^{\Omega(\max(n, \text{rank}(G)))}$ and m too. Ex: $(\mathbf{Z}/2\mathbf{Z})^n$ is not.

Overlattices and Groups

◦ If L is n -dim, $\bar{L}=q^{-1}L$ and $G=(\mathbf{Z}/q\mathbf{Z})^n$ then $\bar{L}/L \cong G$.

◦ There is an **exact sequence**:

$$0 \rightarrow L \xrightarrow{1} \bar{L} \xrightarrow{\phi} G \rightarrow 0$$


◦ $L = \text{Ker } \phi$ where ϕ is efficiently computable.

◦ Let $v_1, \dots, v_m \in \bar{L}$ and define $g_1, \dots, g_m \in G$ by $g_i = \phi(v_i)$.

◦ If $\sum_i x_i g_i = 0$ for $(x_1, \dots, x_m) \in \mathbf{Z}^m$ then $\sum_i x_i v_i \in L$.



Fourier Analysis



- Fourier analysis shows that if $v_1, \dots, v_m \in \bar{L}$ are chosen from a **suitable (short) distribution**, $g_i = \phi(v_i)$ has uniform distribution over G .
- Any probability mass function f over \bar{L} s.t. for any $x \in \bar{L}$, $\sum_{y \in L} f(x+y) \approx 1/\#G$.
Ex: discrete Gaussian distribution.
- This is a **key step**: transforming a worst-case into an average-case.



Worst-to-average Reduction from Mordell's Proof

- Sample short $v_1, \dots, v_m \in \bar{L}$ from a suitable distribution, so that $g_i = \phi(v_i)$ has uniform distrib. over $G = (\mathbf{Z}/q\mathbf{Z})^n$
- Call the SIS-oracle on (g_1, \dots, g_m) to find a short $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_m) \in \mathbf{Z}^m$ s.t. $\sum_i x_i g_i = 0$ in G ,
i.e. $\sum_i x_i v_i \in L$.
- Return $\sum_i x_i v_i \in L$.



Generalized SIS Reduction

- The SIS reduction is based on this crucial fact: If B is a reduced basis of a lattice L , then $q^{-1}B$ is a reduced basis of the **overlattice** $\bar{L}=q^{-1}L$.
- But if G is an arbitrary finite Abelian group, we need to find a reduced basis of some overlattice $\bar{L} \supseteq L$ s.t. $\bar{L}/L \simeq G$, so that we can sample **short vectors** in \bar{L} .



Structural Lattice Reduction

- In **classical lattice reduction**, we try to find a good basis of a given lattice.
- In **structural lattice reduction** [GINX16], given a lattice L and a (sufficiently large) finite Abelian group G , we find a good basis of some overlattice \bar{L} s.t. $\bar{L}/L \simeq G$.
 - Directly using backwards-LLL.
 - Or by reduction to the case $L=\mathbf{Z}^n$.



Easy Cases

- If $G = (\mathbf{Z}/q\mathbf{Z})^n$, any basis B of a full-rank lattice L in \mathbf{Z}^n can be transformed into a basis $q^{-1}B$ of $\bar{L} = q^{-1}L$, which is $q = \#G^{1/n}$ times shorter.
- If $G = \mathbf{Z}^n/L$, the canonical basis of $\bar{L} = \mathbf{Z}^n$ is a short basis, typically $\#G^{1/n}$ times shorter than a short basis of L .

LWE:
A Dual Worst-case
to Average-Case
Reduction



Duality

- Remember the SIS lattice:
 - g_1, \dots, g_m in some finite Abelian group $(G, +)$
 - $L = \{ \mathbf{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_m) \in \mathbf{Z}^m \text{ s.t. } \sum_i x_i g_i = 0 \}$
- The **dual lattice** of L is related to the dual group G^\vee of (additive) characters of G : morphisms from G to $\mathbf{T} = \mathbf{R}/\mathbf{Z}$
 - $L^\vee = \{ (y_1, \dots, y_m) \in \mathbf{R}^m \text{ s.t. for some } s \in G^\vee, \text{ for all } i$
 $y_i \equiv s(g_i) \pmod{1} \}$



The LWE Problem:

Learning (a Character) with Errors

- Let $(G,+)$ be any finite Abelian group
e.g. $G=(\mathbf{Z}/q\mathbf{Z})^n$ in [Re05].
- Pick g_1, \dots, g_m uniformly at random from G .
- Pick a random **character** s in G^\vee .
- Goal: recover **s** given g_1, \dots, g_m and **noisy** approximations of $s(g_1), \dots, s(g_m)$. Ex: Gaussian noise.



Ex: Cyclic G

- Let $G = \mathbf{Z}/q\mathbf{Z}$
- Pick g_1, \dots, g_m uniformly at random mod q .
- Goal: recover $s \in \mathbf{Z}$ given g_1, \dots, g_m and randomized approximations of $sg_1 \bmod q, \dots, sg_m \bmod q$.
- This is exactly a randomized variant of Boneh–Venkatesan's **Hidden Number Problem** from CRYPTO '96.



Hardness of LWE

- [Regev05]: If one can efficiently solve LWE for $G=(\mathbf{Z}/q_n\mathbf{Z})^n$ on the average, then one can **quantum**-efficiently find short vectors in **every n-dim** lattice.
- [GINX16]: This can be generalized to any sequence (G_n) of finite abelian groups, provided that **$\#G_n$ is sufficiently large**.

Conclusion





More Inequalities

- All known upper bounds on Hermite's constant have an algorithmic version.
- Is there a polynomial bound on Hermite's constant, possibly worse than Minkowski's inequality, but with a more efficient algorithmic version?

Thank you for your attention...



Any question(s)?

References

- [GINX16]: « Structural Lattice Reduction: Generalized Worst-Case to Average-Case Reductions and Homomorphic Cryptosystems », EUROCRYPT '16, full version on eprint.
- [N10]: « Hermite's constant and lattice algorithms » survey in the LLL+25 book.

