Deutsche Bank



"Electronic FX trading – where Game Theory meets Data Science"

Frontiers in Quantitative Finance Seminar Series

London, May 2019

Roel Oomen

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• Electronic FX trading



- Electronic FX trading
- Teen-age pregnancies in the USA



- Electronic FX trading
- Teen-age pregnancies in the USA
- The temperature in Stockholm



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- The temperature in Stockholm
- The mortality rate in France during WW I & II




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- Reform of young criminals
- Osteoarthritis
- ADHD
- Lip acceleration
- Gender-neutralising exam conditions

The fertility rate






Source: http://www.humanfertility.org.


The fertility rate





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The temperature in Stockholm




Source: https://bolin.su.se/data/stockholm.



The temperature in Stockholm






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The temperature in Stockholm (cont'd)






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The mortality rate






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
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
7-year old's physical activity level



I acknowledge: the Centre for Longitudinal Studies, Institute of Education for the use of these data; the UK Data Service for making them available; the MRC Centre of Epidemiology for Child Health (Grant reference 60400546), Institute of Child Health, University College London for creating the accelerometer data resource which was funded by the Wellcome Trust (grant reference 0840686/Z/08/A). The institutions and funders acknowledged bear no responsibility for the analysis or interpretation of these data.

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




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Market impact






Source: Deutsche Bank.

* Chart draws only a stratified subset of the full sample. Paths are signed for direction of trade.

Market impact





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All these examples can be studied using Functional Data Analysis or FDA

The price signature



I define a price "signature" as:

$$S(\delta) = rac{1}{q'\iota}\sum_n q_n d_n (P_{t_n+\delta} - P_{t_n}), \qquad ext{for } \delta \in [-\underline{\delta}, \overline{\delta}].$$

It is the volume weighted (q), trade direction adjusted (d), average price movement, over an interval (δ) centred around the point of trading (t).

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- it can be calculated over any and multiple subsets for comparison
 - ... by currency pair, by venue, by order size, etc
 - \ldots by time of the day, by trader / user, etc

The price signature




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
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- it can be calculated over any and multiple subsets for comparison
 - ... by currency pair, by venue, by order size, etc
 - \ldots by time of the day, by trader / user, etc
- it can be applied more generally
 - \ldots to quotes, to rejects, to hypothetical backtest trading signals, etc
 - \ldots to construct volume signatures, spread signatures, liquidity or activity signatures, etc












































Signature interpretation




signature interpretation




Signature interpretation





Signature interpretation







• post-deal ($\delta > 0$), the signature measures the marked-to-market revenues or margin


Signature interpretation






- post-deal ($\delta > 0$), the signature measures the marked-to-market revenues or margin
- pre-deal ($\delta < 0$), the signature measures the opportunity cost of not having traded earlier






Momentum strategy






Momentum strategy






Momentum strategy

Reversal strategy




signature horizon δ (in minutes or hours)



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Alpha / impact







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




Sequential delayed impact




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
Stop-loss order






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


Stop-loss order

Take-profit order




signature horizon δ (in seconds or milli-seconds)




Adverse selection






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


Adverse selection

Latency arbitrage / run-over




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
Asymmetric last look





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Symmetric last look



Assume a simple model (a) price follows a random walk with variance σ^2 , (b) periodic trades at frequency Δ , (c) stochastic trade sign and size

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Then, the signature variance over N trades and for a horizon δ is given by:

$$\gamma(\delta) = \delta \frac{\sigma^2}{N}$$

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
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$$\gamma(\delta) = \delta \frac{\sigma^2}{N} \frac{\mu_q^2 + \sigma_q^2}{\mu_q^2} + \frac{\sigma^2}{N^2} \left(\mu_d^2 \psi_1(\boldsymbol{M}, \delta) + (1 - \mu_d^2) \psi_{\rho_d}(\boldsymbol{M}, \delta) \right) \\ + \frac{\sigma^2}{N^2} \frac{\sigma_q^2}{\mu_q^2} \left(\mu_d^2 \psi_{\rho_q}(\boldsymbol{M}, \delta) + (1 - \mu_d^2) \psi_{\rho_q \rho_d}(\boldsymbol{M}, \delta) \right),$$


where $M = \lfloor \delta / \Delta \rfloor \wedge N$, and

$$\psi_{\rho}(M,\delta) = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{2}NM(2\delta - \Delta(M+1)) + \frac{1}{6}M(M+1)(2M\Delta + \Delta - 3\delta) & \rho = 1\\ \rho(1-\rho^{M})\left(\frac{N\delta}{1-\rho} - \frac{\delta+N\Delta}{(1-\rho)^{2}} - \frac{(\rho+1)\Delta}{(\rho-1)^{3}}\right) + M\rho^{M+1}\left(\frac{\Delta(N-M)+\delta}{1-\rho} - \frac{2\Delta}{(1-\rho)^{2}}\right) & \rho \neq 1 \end{cases}$$









Under the "noise trader" null-hypothesis, the signature variance is a function of

- signature horizon vs trading frequency (up to $\delta < \Delta$ the simple " \sqrt{T} " rule applies)
- properties of the trading strategy (i.e. average and serial correlation of trade sign; amounts)

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Ramsay and Dalzell (1991), Ramsay and Silverman (1997) pioneers of the contemporary literature.



Functional data analysis

To illustrate – in its simplest form – FDA calculates quantities like:

$$SSH(\delta) = \sum_{k=1}^{K} N_k (S_k(\delta) - S(\delta))^2,$$
 (between group variation),

and

$$SSE(\delta) = \sum_{k=1}^{K} \sum_{n=1}^{N_k} (s_n^{(k)}(\delta) - S_k(\delta))^2$$
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 (within group variation).

An example of a test for equality of functions (i.e. signatures), is the globalised F test:

$$\mathcal{T}_{FG} = rac{N-K}{K-1} \int rac{SSH(\delta)}{SSE(\delta)} d\delta \sim a\chi_b^2 ext{ approximately},$$

(developed by Zhang and Liang, 2014).

Functional data analysis



. . . where

$$a = \overline{\delta} \frac{N - K - 2}{(K - 1)(N - K)} \operatorname{tr}(\gamma_c^{\otimes 2}) \quad \text{and} \quad b = \overline{\delta}^2 \frac{(K - 1)(N - K)^2}{(N - K - 2)^2} \operatorname{tr}(\gamma_c^{\otimes 2}),$$

and $\gamma_c(\delta_1, \delta_2) = \gamma(\delta_1, \delta_2) / \sqrt{\gamma(\delta_1, \delta_1)\gamma(\delta_2, \delta_2)}$, $\gamma^{\otimes 2}(\delta_1, \delta_2) = \int \gamma(\delta_1, u)\gamma(u, \delta_2) du$, and estimates for γ functions can be obtained as:

$$\begin{split} \widehat{\gamma}(\delta_1, \delta_2) &= \frac{1}{N - K} \sum_{k=1}^K \sum_{n=1}^{N_k} (s_n^{(k)}(\delta_1) - S_k(\delta_1)) (s_n^{(k)}(\delta_2) - S_k(\delta_2)), \\ \widehat{\mathrm{tr}^2(\gamma)} &= \frac{(N - K)(N - K + 1)}{(N - K - 1)(N - K + 2)} \left(\mathrm{tr}^2(\widehat{\gamma}) - \frac{2\mathrm{tr}(\widehat{\gamma}^{\otimes 2})}{N - K + 1} \right), \\ \mathrm{tr}(\widehat{\gamma^{\otimes 2}}) &= \frac{(N - K)^2}{(N - K - 1)(N - K + 2)} \left(\mathrm{tr}(\widehat{\gamma}^{\otimes 2}) - \frac{\mathrm{tr}^2(\widehat{\gamma})}{N - K} \right), \end{split}$$

where $N = \sum_{k} N_k$. See, e.g., Horváth and Kokoszka (2012), Zhang (2014) for further details.

Non-parametric resampling approach

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Standard FDA does not apply straight "out of the box" to signature analysis

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... "mechanical" dependence across price paths, depending on signature horizon ($P_{t_n+\delta}$)

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 \dots "mechanical" dependence across price paths, depending on signature horizon ($P_{t_n+\delta}$)

... trade sign adjustment of price paths (d_n)

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Standard FDA does not apply straight "out of the box" to signature analysis

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
- stationary bootstrap (Politis and Romano, 1994) works well ...
- but it doesn't make full use of known signature dependence structure




Short signature horizon, i.e. $\delta = \longmapsto$














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










Medium signature horizon, i.e. $\delta = \vdash$

















Bootstrap performance







• Aggregation. Traders in the FX market routinely place liquidity providers (LPs) in competition for their flow

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See Oomen (2017a,b), and Butz and Oomen (2018) for further details.



Signature case studies



A trader executes using an aggregator with multiple LPs

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- trade request rejects complicate the workflow
- addition of LPs has meant spreads are gradually widening out

They are open to a radical change or experiment to improve matters.





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
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
DB proposes a "firm" feed and tighter spreads than what the trader receives in aggregate across all LPs, on the basis that they become the trader's exclusive liquidity partner.

... trader believes the flow at source is latency sensitive and directional

... DB believes the flow is benign at source, but that the aggregator design is the issue



- Trader tries out exclusivity arrangement for one main currency pair
- It appears to radically lower post-deal impact (i.e. aggregator design explains the difference)
- But is it significant?



- Trader tries out exclusivity arrangement for one main currency pair
- It appears to radically lower post-deal impact (i.e. aggregator design explains the difference)
- But is it significant?
- FDA + resampling \rightarrow yes, it is highly significant!

Trader adopts the exclusive feed

(with backup LP for resilience)



Trader adopts the exclusive feed (with backup LP for resilience)

$\checkmark\,$ improved trader experience

- $\ldots \ \text{response time} \downarrow$
- $\ldots \ {\sf rejects} \ \times$
- $\ldots \ \mathsf{spreads} \downarrow$
- $\ldots \ costs \downarrow$
- \ldots workflow simplification \uparrow



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- \dots volume \uparrow
- \ldots winner's curse \times
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	aggregator	exclusivity		
Trader's execution setup				
# LPs	> 5	1		
externalisers	probably	no		

stack sweep yes N/A

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	aggregator	exclusivity		
Trader's execution s	etup			
# LPs	> 5	1		
externalisers	probably	no		
stack sweep	yes	N/A		
DB liquidity configuration				
nominal spread	1.2	0.3		
response time	100ms	1ms		
reject rate	pprox 10%	0.0%		

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nominal spread	1.2	0.3		
response time	100ms	1ms		
reject rate	pprox 10%	0.0%		
Trader's transaction costs				
observed spread	0.5	0.3		
effective spread	> 0.5	0.3		

Note: figures are for illustrative purposes only.

Case-study II : Consistency of LP risk management style



A trader executes using an aggregator with 7 $\ensuremath{\mathsf{LPs}}$



A trader executes using an aggregator with 7 LPs but is unsure it's working well.


- mixed experience on selected execution (impact, reject rates)
- regularly speaks with LPs' sales representatives about the liquidity offering, but can't quite identify (whether there is) an issue




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A quantitative data-driven analysis is conducted using an anonymised trade set









LP 1			
LP 2			
LP 3			
LP 4			
LP 5			
LP 6			
LP 7			



	LP 1
LP 1	
LP 2	40.8%
LP 3	0.0%
LP 4	0.1%
LP 5	0.0%
LP 6	0.0%
LP 7	0.0%



	LP 1	LP 2
LP 1		2
LP 2	40.8%	
LP 3	0.0%	0.0%
LP 4	0.1%	0.2%
LP 5	0.0%	0.0%
LP 6	0.0%	0.0%
LP 7	0.0%	0.0%





	LP 1	LP 2	LP 3	LP 4
LP 1		*	\neq	¥
LP 2	40.8%		\neq	¥
LP 3	0.0%	0.0%		\approx
LP 4	0.1%	0.2%	73.6%	
LP 5	0.0%	0.0%	9.8%	17.5%
LP 6	0.0%	0.0%	28.7%	39.4%
LP 7	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%



	LP 1	LP 2	LP 3	LP 4	LP 5
LP 1		*	¥	¥	¥
LP 2	40.8%		\neq	\neq	¥
LP 3	0.0%	0.0%		\approx	\approx
LP 4	0.1%	0.2%	73.6%		\approx
LP 5	0.0%	0.0%	9.8%	17.5%	
LP 6	0.0%	0.0%	28.7%	39.4%	79.2%
LP 7	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%




	LP 1	LP 2	LP 3	LP 4	LP 5	LP 6
LP 1		*	¥	¥	¥	¥
LP 2	40.8%		\neq	\neq	\neq	\neq
LP 3	0.0%	0.0%		\approx	\approx	\approx
LP 4	0.1%	0.2%	73.6%		\approx	\approx
LP 5	0.0%	0.0%	9.8%	17.5%		\approx
LP 6	0.0%	0.0%	28.7%	39.4%	79.2%	
LP 7	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%



	LP 1	LP 2	LP 3	LP 4	LP 5	LP 6	LP 7
LP 1		*	¥	¥	¥	¥	¥
LP 2	40.8%		\neq	\neq	\neq	\neq	\neq
LP 3	0.0%	0.0%		\approx	\approx	~	\neq
LP 4	0.1%	0.2%	73.6%		\approx	\approx	\neq
LP 5	0.0%	0.0%	9.8%	17.5%		\approx	\neq
LP 6	0.0%	0.0%	28.7%	39.4%	79.2%		\neq
LP 7	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	



	LP 1	LP 2	LP 3	LP 4	LP 5	LP 6	LP 7
LP 1		~	\neq	\neq	\neq	\neq	¥
LP 2	40.8%		\neq	\neq	\neq	\neq	\neq
LP 3	0.0%	0.0%		\approx	\approx	\approx	\neq
LP 4	0.1%	0.2%	73.6%		\approx	\approx	\neq
LP 5	0.0%	0.0%	9.8%	17.5%		\approx	\neq
LP 6	0.0%	0.0%	28.7%	39.4%	79.2%		\neq
LP 7	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	



Natural classification into:

- a) passive internalisers,
- b) impatient internalisers,
- c) aggressive internalisers or externalisers

(as discussed in Butz and Oomen, 2018)



Is the LP classification stable over time?



Is the LP classification stable over time? Apply FDA on LP group signatures across a split sample.




Is the LP classification stable over time? Apply FDA on LP group signatures across a split sample.

		1st	half of san	nple		2nd ł	nalf of sam	nple
		LP 1-2	LP 3-6	LP 7	-	LP 1-2	LP 3-6	LP 7
f	LP 1-2		≠	≠		*	≠	¥
half	LP 3-6	0.6%		\neq		≠	~	¥
lst	LP 7	0.0%	0.0%			¥	¥	~
		72.00/	0.00/	0.00/			1	1
Η	LP 1-2	73.9%	0.9%	0.0%			\neq	\neq
l half	LP 3-6	0.0%	45.5%	0.1%		0.1%		\neq
2nd	LP 7	0.0%	0.0%	84.4%		0.0%	0.1%	

Ζ

signatures over split sample







Trader reduces # of LPs and intensifies relationship with passive internalisers



Trader reduces # of LPs and intensifies relationship with passive internalisers

- $\checkmark\,$ reducing post-deal impact
- $\checkmark\,$ reducing direct and indirect execution costs
- $\checkmark\,$ simplifying the liquidity pool, reducing overheads

A trader runs the following 9-week experiment:

• aggregator composition unchanged for 7 of 9 weeks (largely internalising LPs)

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
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
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Let's calculate the price signatures week-by-week ...











Week 1			
Week 2			
Week 3			
Week 4			
Week 5			
Week 6			
Week 7			



	Week 1
Week 1	
Week 2	70.6%
Week 3	41.2%
Week 4	93.6%
Week 5	59.1%
Week 6	90.1%
Week 7	63.7%



	Week 1	Week 2
Week 1		2
Week 2	70.6%	
Week 3	41.2%	38.0%
Week 4	93.6%	94.2%
Week 5	59.1%	48.0%
Week 6	90.1%	69.9%
Week 7	63.7%	31.3%



	Week 1	Week 2	Week 3
Week 1		~	*
Week 2	70.6%		\approx
Week 3	41.2%	38.0%	
Week 4	93.6%	94.2%	43.5%
Week 5	59.1%	48.0%	85.6%
Week 6	90.1%	69.9%	68.4%
Week 7	63.7%	31.3%	47.6%



	Week 1	Week 2	Week 3	Week 4
Week 1		~	~	~
Week 2	70.6%		\approx	\approx
Week 3	41.2%	38.0%		~
Week 4	93.6%	94.2%	43.5%	
Week 5	59.1%	48.0%	85.6%	51.8%
Week 6	90.1%	69.9%	68.4%	88.2%
Week 7	63.7%	31.3%	47.6%	49.5%



	Week 1	Week 2	Week 3	Week 4	Week 5
Week 1		*	~	~	*
Week 2	70.6%		~	~	\approx
Week 3	41.2%	38.0%		\approx	\approx
Week 4	93.6%	94.2%	43.5%		~
Week 5	59.1%	48.0%	85.6%	51.8%	
Week 6	90.1%	69.9%	68.4%	88.2%	88.5%
Week 7	63.7%	31.3%	47.6%	49.5%	62.3%



	Week 1	Week 2	Week 3	Week 4	Week 5	Week 6
Week 1		*	~	~	*	*
Week 2	70.6%		\approx	\approx	\approx	\approx
Week 3	41.2%	38.0%		\approx	\approx	\approx
Week 4	93.6%	94.2%	43.5%		\approx	~
Week 5	59.1%	48.0%	85.6%	51.8%		\approx
Week 6	90.1%	69.9%	68.4%	88.2%	88.5%	
Week 7	63.7%	31.3%	47.6%	49.5%	62.3%	87.1%



	Week 1	Week 2	Week 3	Week 4	Week 5	Week 6	Week 7
Week 1		2	*	*	2	2	*
Week 2	70.6%		\approx	\approx	~	~	\approx
Week 3	41.2%	38.0%		~	~	~	~
Week 4	93.6%	94.2%	43.5%		~	~	~
Week 5	59.1%	48.0%	85.6%	51.8%		~	\approx
Week 6	90.1%	69.9%	68.4%	88.2%	88.5%		~
Week 7	63.7%	31.3%	47.6%	49.5%	62.3%	87.1%	



	Week 1	Week 2	Week 3	Week 4	Week 5	Week 6	Week 7	Week 8
Week 1		*	~	~	*	~	*	¥
Week 2	70.6%		\approx	\approx	\approx	\approx	\approx	\neq
Week 3	41.2%	38.0%		\approx	\approx	~	\approx	\neq
Week 4	93.6%	94.2%	43.5%		\approx	~	\approx	\neq
Week 5	59.1%	48.0%	85.6%	51.8%		~	\approx	\neq
Week 6	90.1%	69.9%	68.4%	88.2%	88.5%		\approx	\neq
Week 7	63.7%	31.3%	47.6%	49.5%	62.3%	87.1%		\neq
Week 8	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	



Apply FDA on the pair-wise micro signatures ... does post-deal impact vary by week?


	Week 1	Week 2	Week 3	Week 4	Week 5	Week 6	Week 7	Week 8	Week 9
Week 1		*	*	*	*	*	*	≠	¥
Week 2	70.6%		\approx	\approx	~	~	~	≠	¥
Week 3	41.2%	38.0%		\approx	~	~	\approx	\neq	¥
Week 4	93.6%	94.2%	43.5%		~	~	~	\neq	¥
Week 5	59.1%	48.0%	85.6%	51.8%		~	\approx	\neq	\neq
Week 6	90.1%	69.9%	68.4%	88.2%	88.5%		\approx	\neq	\neq
Week 7	63.7%	31.3%	47.6%	49.5%	62.3%	87.1%		\neq	¥
Week 8	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%		\approx
Week 9	1.1%	1.8%	0.1%	1.5%	0.3%	1.2%	0.6%	9.4%	



Apply FDA on the pair-wise micro signatures ... does post-deal impact vary by week?


	Week 1	Week 2	Week 3	Week 4	Week 5	Week 6	Week 7	Week 8	Week 9
Week 1		*	~	~	*	*	*	≠	≠
Week 2	70.6%		\approx	\approx	\approx	\approx	\approx	≠	¥
Week 3	41.2%	38.0%		\approx	\approx	\approx	\approx	≠	¥
Week 4	93.6%	94.2%	43.5%		\approx	~	\approx	≠	¥
Week 5	59.1%	48.0%	85.6%	51.8%		\approx	\approx	\neq	¥
Week 6	90.1%	69.9%	68.4%	88.2%	88.5%		\approx	\neq	¥
Week 7	63.7%	31.3%	47.6%	49.5%	62.3%	87.1%		\neq	¥
Week 8	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%		\approx
Week 9	1.1%	1.8%	0.1%	1.5%	0.3%	1.2%	0.6%	9.4%	






This document is intended solely for discussion purposes.






p-value for equality between week 2 & 7

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• FDA indicates large & statistically significant impact on post-deal impacts associated with introduction of externaliser



- FDA indicates large & statistically significant impact on post-deal impacts associated with introduction of externaliser
- if maintained, would give rise to "prisoner's dilemma" where both the trader and the LPs are worse off (see Oomen, 2017a, for more details)



What if the trader had not informed the LPs about the experiment?



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
What if an LP doesn't inform the trader that they'll switch their risk management style from internalisation to externalisation?



What if the trader had not informed the LPs about the experiment?


What if an LP doesn't inform the trader that they'll switch their risk management style from internalisation to externalisation?

FDA can be used to check for structural breaks in the signatures.



breakpoint detection test

• The trader executes >15,000 trades with LPs over a 9 week period.



breakpoint detection test

- The trader executes >15,000 trades with LPs over a 9 week period.
- A break is identified 83 trades or $23\frac{1}{2}$ minutes after the actual break!





Candidate externaliser LP was not admitted to the pool, and everyone lived happily ever after ...



Thank you for your attention!

Note: the paper is now published in Quantitative Finance, 19 (5), 733 - 761

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