

# Reducing Signature Size of Matrix-code-based Signature Schemes

<https://ia.cr/2024/495>


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# What this paper is about



# Matrix code equivalence (MCE)

## Definition

Given dimension- $k$  linear codes  $\mathcal{C}_0, \mathcal{C}_1$ , where code words are considered as matrices in  $\mathbb{F}_q^{m \times n}$ . MCE asks to find  $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{m \times m}$ ,  $\mathbf{B} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n \times n}$ , such that  $\mathcal{C}_1 = \mathbf{A} \cdot \mathcal{C}_0 \cdot \mathbf{B}$ .

- The map induced by  $(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B})$  is called an **isometry** between the codes.
- The first version of specification shows parameter sets with  $m = n = k$ .


# The MEDS $\Sigma$ -protocol and signature scheme

$$\mathcal{C}_0$$
$$(\text{pk})$$


## The MEDS $\Sigma$ -protocol and signature scheme

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \mathcal{C}_0 & \xrightarrow{\text{sk} = (\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B})} & \mathcal{C}_1 \\ (\text{pk}) & & (\text{pk}) \end{array}$$


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
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
- Verification: apply  $rsp$  to  $\mathcal{C}_{ch}$ , compare with  $cmt$ .
- FS transform is applied to obtain the MEDS signature scheme.
- $rsp$  takes  $m^2 + n^2$  field elements to represent.




## Main idea for MEDS



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


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


- What if we represent  $(A', B')$  as  $(C_0, C_1, D_0, D_1)$ ?

# New $\Sigma$ -protocol for MEDS ( $|m - n| \leq 1$ )



## New $\Sigma$ -protocol for MEDS ( $|m - n| \leq 1$ )



- $(\mathbf{C}_0, \mathbf{C}_1)$  takes  $2k$  coordinates to represent.
- $(\mathbf{D}_0, \mathbf{D}_1)$  can be considered as public data.

## Solving for $\tilde{\mathbf{A}}, \tilde{\mathbf{B}}$

- Want to find  $\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B}$  such that

$$\mathbf{D}_0 = \mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{C}_0 \cdot \mathbf{B}$$

$$\mathbf{D}_1 = \mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{C}_1 \cdot \mathbf{B}.$$

- We solve the linear system ( $m^2 + n^2$  variables,  $2mn$  equations.) resulted from

$$\mathbf{D}_0 \cdot \mathbf{B}^{-1} = \mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{C}_0$$

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
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- When  $m = n$ ,  $\#\text{eq} = \#\text{var}$ , leading to  $\mathbf{A} = \mathbf{B}^{-1} = 0$ .
- When  $|m - n| = 1$ ,  $\#\text{var} - \#\text{eq} = 1$ , leading to solutions  $(\alpha\mathbf{A}, \alpha^{-1}\mathbf{B})$ .
- Otherwise,  $\#\text{var} - \#\text{eq} > 1$ , leading to too many degrees of freedom.

## A specific choice for $\mathbf{D}_0, \mathbf{D}_1$

- Let's try  $n = m + 1$  and  $\mathbf{D}_0 = (\mathbf{I}_m \ 0) \in \mathbb{F}_q^{m \times n}$ ,  $\mathbf{D}_1 = (0 \ \mathbf{I}_m) \in \mathbb{F}_q^{m \times n}$ .



- Reducing the system boils down to reducing  $\mathbf{M}$ , which takes  $O(n^3)$  field operations.
- Reducing the generator matrix of `cmt` takes  $O(n^4)$  field operations.



## Old and new parameter sets for MEDS

category	$q$	$n$	$m$	$k$	$s$	$t$	$w$	pk (bytes)	sig (bytes)
$< I$	4093	14	14	14	4	1152	14	9923	9896
$\geq I$		26	25	25	2	144	48	21595	5200
$< III$	4093	22	22	22	4	608	26	41711	41080
$\geq III$		35	34	34	2	208	75	55520	10906
$< V$	2039	30	30	30	5	192	52	134180	132528
$\geq V$	4093	45	44	44	2	272	103	122000	19068

- The attack from Eurocrypt 2024 is considered.

## Application to ALTEQ

category	$n$	$\alpha$	$C$	$r$	$K$	pk (bytes)	sig (bytes)
I	13		458	16	14	523968	9528
	13	6	657	29	11	512476	3752
III	20		229	39	20	1044264	32504
	20	7	297	69	17	1045464	10816
V	25		227	67	25	2088432	63908
	25	8	276	88	23	2070032	20544

- For MEDS, isometries are represented as code words.
- For ALTEQ, isometries are represented as **partial** code words.

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