Equilibrium in risk-sharing games

The large majority of risk-sharing transactions involve few agents, each of whom can heavily influence the structure and the prices of securities. This paper proposes a game where agents' strategic sets consist of all possible sharing securities and pricing kernels that are consistent with Arrow-Debreu sharing rules. First, it is shown that agents' best response problems have unique solutions, even when the underlying probability space is infinite. The risk-sharing Nash equilibrium admits a finite-dimensional characterisation and it is proved to exist for general number of agents and be unique in the two-agent game. In equilibrium, agents choose to declare beliefs on future random outcomes different from their actual probability assessments, and the risk-sharing securities are endogenously bounded, implying (amongst other things) loss of efficiency. In addition, an analysis regarding extremely risk tolerant agents indicates that they profit more from the Nash risk-sharing equilibrium as compared to the Arrow-Debreu one.
(Joint work with Michail Anthropelos)