Efficient post-quantum crypto from module lattices

7 February 2018
Peter Schwabe

Large parts of the cryptography in use today,

key-agreement protocols and digital signatures based on the

hardness of factoring large integers or solving the

discrete-logarithm problem, are not secure against attackers

equipped with a large universal quantum computer. It is not

clear when such a large quantum computer will be built, but

continuous progress by various labs around the world suggests

that it may well be less than two decades until today's

cryptography will become insecure.

To address this issue, NIST started a public competition to

identify suitable replacements for today's cryptosystems. In

my talk, I will describe two of these systems: the

key-encapsulation mechanism Kyber and the digital signature

scheme Dilithium. Both schemes are based on the hardness of

solving problems in module lattices and they together form the

"Cryptographic Suite for Algebraic Lattices -- CRYSTALS".

  • Cryptography Seminar