Date
Thu, 24 May 2018
Time
14:00 - 15:00
Location
L4
Speaker
Prof. Michael Ferris
Organisation
University of Wisconsin


In the past few decades, power grids across the world have become dependent on markets that aim to efficiently match supply with demand at all times via a variety of pricing and auction mechanisms. These markets are based on models that capture interactions between producers, transmission and consumers. Energy producers typically maximize profits by optimally allocating and scheduling resources over time. A dynamic equilibrium aims to determine prices and dispatches that can be transmitted over the electricity grid to satisfy evolving consumer requirements for energy at different locations and times. Computation allows large scale practical implementations of socially optimal models to be solved as part of the market operation, and regulations can be imposed that aim to ensure competitive behaviour of market participants.

Questions remain that will be outlined in this presentation.

Firstly, the recent explosion in the use of renewable supply such as wind, solar and hydro has led to increased volatility in this system. We demonstrate how risk can impose significant costs on the system that are not modeled in the context of socially optimal power system markets and highlight the use of contracts to reduce or recover these costs. We also outline how battery storage can be used as an effective hedging instrument.

Secondly, how do we guarantee continued operation in rarely occuring situations and when failures occur and how do we price this robustness?

Thirdly, how do we guarantee appropriate participant behaviour? Specifically, is it possible for participants to develop strategies that move the system to operating points that are not socially optimal?

Fourthly, how do we ensure enough transmission (and generator) capacity in the long term, and how do we recover the costs of this enhanced infrastructure?
 

Please contact us with feedback and comments about this page. Last updated on 04 Apr 2022 14:57.