Nomura-OMI Seminar: Optimal exit under moral hazard
Abstract
We revisit the optimal exit problem by adding a moral hazard problem where a firm owner contracts out with an agent to run a project. We analyse the optimal contracting problem between the owner and the agent in a Brownian framework, when the latter modifies the project cash-flows with an hidden action. The analysis leads to the resolution of a constrained optimal stopping problem that we solve explicitly.
How does a uniformly sampled Markov chain behave ?
Abstract
This is joint work with P. Caputo and D. Chafai. In this talk, we
will consider various probability distributions on the set of stochastic
matrices with n states and on the set of Laplacian/Kirchhoff
matrices on n states. They will arise naturally from the conductance model on
n states with i.i.d conductances. With the help of random matrix
theory, we will study the spectrum of these processes.
15:45