L3

TBA

Stability is the prototypical model theoretic dividing line. One interpretation is that a binary relation is stable if it is "close to unary": if the question $(x,y)\in E$ can be answered, at least most of the time, by knowing enough information about $x$, and separately enough information about $y$.

One natural question is asking how this can generalize to ternary (and higher-arity) relations. The connection to hypergraph regularity suggests an approach to identifying ternary stable-like properties, and also that there should be several versions, since a ternary relation could be almost unary, or almost binary, or a combination of these properties.

In this talk, I'll survey some of what we know about several of these "stable-like" ternary notions.

This paper advances the theory of \textit{Collective Finance}, as developed in \cite{BDFFM26}, \cite{DFM25} and \cite{F25}. Within a general semimartingale framework, we study the relationship between collective market efficiency and individual rationality. We derive necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of (possibly zero-sum) exchanges among agents that strictly increase their indirect utilities and characterize this condition in terms of the compatibility between agents’ preferences and collective pricing measures. The framework applies to both continuous and discrete-time models and clarifies when cooperation leads to a strict improvement in each participating agent’s indirect utility.

TBA

This is a joint OxPDE and Numerical Analysis seminar.