Dept of Statistics London School of Economics

The large majority of risk-sharing transactions involve few agents, each of whom can heavily influence the structure and the prices of securities. This paper proposes a game where agents' strategic sets consist of all possible sharing securities and pricing kernels that are consistent with Arrow-Debreu sharing rules. First, it is shown that agents' best response problems have unique solutions, even when the underlying probability space is infinite. The risk-sharing Nash equilibrium admits a finite-dimensional characterisation and it is proved to exist for general number of agents and be unique in the two-agent game. In equilibrium, agents choose to declare beliefs on future random outcomes different from their actual probability assessments, and the risk-sharing securities are endogenously bounded, implying (amongst other things) loss of efficiency. In addition, an analysis regarding extremely risk tolerant agents indicates that they profit more from the Nash risk-sharing equilibrium as compared to the Arrow-Debreu one.
(Joint work with Michail Anthropelos)

The McKean stochastic game (MSG) is a two-player version of the perpetual American put option. The MSG consists of two agents and a certain payoff function of an underlying stochastic process. One agent (the seller) is looking for a strategy (stopping time) which minimises the expected pay-off, while the other agent (the buyer) tries to maximise this quantity.

For Brownian motion one can find the value of the MSG and the optimal stopping times by solving a free boundary value problem. For a Lévy process with jumps the corresponding free boundary problem is more difficult to solve directly and instead we use fluctuation theory to find the solution of the MSG driven by a Lévy process with no positive jumps. One interesting aspect is that the optimal stopping region for the minimiser "thickens" from a point to an interval in the presence of jumps. This talk is based on joint work with Andreas Kyprianou (University of Bath).