This paper advances the theory of \textit{Collective Finance}, as developed in \cite{BDFFM26}, \cite{DFM25} and \cite{F25}. Within a general semimartingale framework, we study the relationship between collective market efficiency and individual rationality. We derive necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of (possibly zero-sum) exchanges among agents that strictly increase their indirect utilities and characterize this condition in terms of the compatibility between agents’ preferences and collective pricing measures. The framework applies to both continuous and discrete-time models and clarifies when cooperation leads to a strict improvement in each participating agent’s indirect utility.

The Springer correspondence parameterises the irreducible representations of the Weyl group of a complex semisimple Lie algebra by nilpotent orbits. A key ingredient in the construction is the convolution operation, which appears in various forms throughout geometric representation theory. In this talk, we'll introduce the geometry of the Springer resolution, describe the convolution operation, and illustrate how it gives rise to a geometric construction of Weyl group representations.