This paper advances the theory of \textit{Collective Finance}, as developed in \cite{BDFFM26}, \cite{DFM25} and \cite{F25}. Within a general semimartingale framework, we study the relationship between collective market efficiency and individual rationality. We derive necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of (possibly zero-sum) exchanges among agents that strictly increase their indirect utilities and characterize this condition in terms of the compatibility between agents’ preferences and collective pricing measures. The framework applies to both continuous and discrete-time models and clarifies when cooperation leads to a strict improvement in each participating agent’s indirect utility.

For any manifold, we can assign its mapping class group, that is, the group of its diffeomorphisms modulo isotopies. Although such a group can be studied for manifolds of any dimension, the mapping class groups of surfaces draw special attention. They are isomorphic to the outer automorphism groups of $\pi_1(S)$ and have many properties similar to lattices in semisimple Lie groups, as well as connections with the theory of moduli of curves.

One of the most important parts of the research on mapping class groups is the study of their representation. In particular, in the general situation, we still don't know if they have a faithful representation into $\operatorname{GL}_n(\mathbb{C})$.

In my talk, I will show basic facts about mapping class groups and briefly describe a few known methods for constructing their representations and discuss their properties. In particular, I will present recent results classifying low-dimensional representations of the mapping class group.