Abstract: We propose a term structure power price model that, in contrast to widely accepted no-arbitrage based approaches, accounts for the non-storable nature of power. It belongs to a class of equilibrium game theoretic models with players divided into producers and consumers. Consumers' goal is to maximize a mean-variance utility function subject to satisfying inelastic demand of their own clients (e.g households, businesses etc.) to whom they sell the power on. Producers, who own a portfolio of power plants each defined by a running fuel (e.g. gas, coal, oil...) and physical characteristics (e.g. efficiency, capacity, ramp up/down times, startup costs...), would, similarly, like to maximize a mean-variance utility function consisting of power, fuel, and emission prices subject to production constraints. Our goal is to determine the term structure of the power price at which production matches consumption. In this talk we outline that such a price exists and develop conditions under which it is also unique. Under condition of existence, we propose a tractable quadratic programming formulation for finding the equilibrium term structure of the power price. Numerical results show performance of the algorithm when modeling the whole system of UK power plants.
