Seminar series
Date
Fri, 27 Jan 2012
14:15
Location
DH 1st floor SR
Speaker
Jose Blanchet
Organisation
Columbia

We propose a dynamic insurance network model that allows to deal with reinsurance counter-party default risks with a particular aim of capturing cascading effects at the time of defaults. We capture these effects by finding an equilibrium allocation of settlements which can be found as the unique optimal solution of a linear programming problem. This equilibrium allocation recognizes 1) the correlation among the risk factors, which are assumed to be heavy-tailed, 2) the contractual obligations, which are assumed to follow popular contracts in the insurance industry (such as stop-loss and retro-cesion), and 3) the interconnections of the insurance-reinsurance network. We are able to obtain an asymptotic description of the most likely ways in which the default of a specific group of insurers can occur, by means of solving a multidimensional Knapsack integer programming problem. Finally, we propose a class of provably strongly efficient estimators for computing the expected loss of the network conditioning the failure of a specific set of companies. Strong efficiency means that the complexity of computing large deviations probability or conditional expectation remains bounded as the event of interest becomes more and more rare.

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