Imperial College London

Networks are a widely-used tool to investigate the large-scale connectivity structure in complex systems and graphons have been proposed as an infinite size limit of dense networks. The detection of communities or other meso-scale structures is a prominent topic in network science as it allows the identification of functional building blocks in complex systems. When such building blocks may be present in graphons is an open question. In this paper, we define a graphon-modularity and demonstrate that it can be maximised to detect communities in graphons. We then investigate specific synthetic graphons and show that they may show a wide range of different community structures. We also reformulate the graphon-modularity maximisation as a continuous optimisation problem and so prove the optimal community structure or lack thereof for some graphons, something that is usually not possible for networks. Furthermore, we demonstrate that estimating a graphon from network data as an intermediate step can improve the detection of communities, in comparison with exclusively maximising the modularity of the network. While the choice of graphon-estimator may strongly influence the accord between the community structure of a network and its estimated graphon, we find that there is a substantial overlap if an appropriate estimator is used. Our study demonstrates that community detection for graphons is possible and may serve as a privacy-preserving way to cluster network data.

arXiv link: https://arxiv.org/abs/2101.00503

Abstract: We formulate and solve a multi-player stochastic differential game between financial agents who seek to cost-efficiently liquidate their position in a risky asset in the presence of jointly aggregated transient price impact on the risky asset's execution price along with taking into account a common general price predicting signal. In contrast to an interaction of the agents through purely permanent price impact as it is typically considered in the literature on multi-player price impact games, accrued transient price impact does not persist but decays over time. The unique Nash-equilibrium strategies reveal how each agent's liquidation policy adjusts the predictive trading signal for the accumulated transient price distortion induced by all other agents' price impact; and thus unfolds a direct and natural link in equilibrium between the trading signal and the agents' trading activity. We also formulate and solve the corresponding mean field game in the limit of infinitely many agents and show how the latter provides an approximate Nash-equilibrium for the finite-player game. Specifically we prove the convergence of the N-players game optimal strategy to the optimal strategy of the mean field game.     (Joint work with Moritz Voss)
 

We consider the homogenization of a Stokes system in a domain having many small random holes. This model mainly arises from problems of solid-fluid interaction (e.g. the flow of a viscous and incompressible fluid through a porous medium). We aim at the rigorous derivation of the homogenization limit both in the Brinkmann regime and in the one of Darcy’s law. In particular, we focus on holes that are distributed according to probability measures that allow for overlapping and clustering phenomena.

In this talk, we will introduce two problems of contract theory, in continuous–time, with a multitude of agents. First, we will study a model of optimal contracting in a hierarchy, which generalises the one–period framework of Sung (2015). The hierarchy is modeled by a series of interlinked principal–agent problems, leading to a sequence of Stackelberg equilibria. More precisely, the principal (she) can contract with a manager (he), to incentivise him to act in her best interest, despite only observing the net benefits of the total hierarchy. The manager in turn subcontracts the agents below him. Both agents and the manager each independently control a stochastic process representing their outcome. We will see through a simple example that even if the agents only control the drift of their outcome, the manager controls the volatility of the Agents’ continuation utility. Even this first simple example justifies the use of recent results on optimal contracting for drift and volatility control, and therefore the theory on 2BSDEs. We will also discuss some possible extensions of this model. In particular, one extension consists in the elaboration of more general contracts, indexing the compensation of one worker on the result of the others. This increase in the complexity of contracts is beneficial for the principal, and constitutes a first approach to even more complex contracts, in the case, for example, of a continuum of workers with mean–field interactions. This will lead us to introduce the second problem, namely optimal contracting for demand–response management, which consists in extending the model by Aïd, Possamaï, and Touzi (2019) to a mean–field of consumers. Finally, we will conclude by mentioning that this principal-agent approach with a multitude of agents can be used to address many situations, for example to model incentives for
lockdown in the current epidemic context.
 

Grothendieck's Quot schemes — moduli spaces of quotient sheaves — are fundamental objects in algebraic geometry, but we know very little about them. This talk will focus on a relatively simple special case: the Quot scheme Quotˡ(E) of length l quotients of a vector bundle E of rank r on a smooth surface S. The scheme Quotˡ(E) is a cross of the Hilbert scheme of points of S (E=O) and the projectivisation of E (l=1); it carries a virtual fundamental class, and if l and r are at least 2, then Quotˡ(E) is singular. I will explain how the ADHM description of Quotˡ(E) provides a conjectural description of the singularities, and show how they can be resolved in the l=2 case. Furthermore, I will describe the relation between Quotˡ(E) and Quotˡ of a quotient of E, prove a functoriality result for the virtual fundamental class, and use it to compute certain tautological integrals over Quotˡ(E).

Networks are an imperfect representation of a dataset, yet often there is little consideration for how these imperfections may affect network evolution and structure.

In this talk, I want to discuss a simple set of generative network models in which the mechanism of network growth is decomposed into two layers. The first layer represents the “observed” network, corresponding to our conventional understanding of a network. Here I want to consider the scenario in which the network you observe is not self-contained, but is driven by a second hidden network, comprised of the same nodes but different edge structure. I will show how a range of different network growth models can be constructed such that the observed and hidden networks can be causally decoupled, coupled only in one direction, or coupled in both directions.

One consequence of such models is the emergence of abrupt transitions in observed network topology – one example results in scale-free degree distributions which are robust up to an arbitrarily long threshold time, but which naturally break down as the network grows larger. I will argue that such examples illustrate why we should be wary of an overreliance on static networks (measured at only one point in time), and will discuss other possible implications for prediction on networks.

Computers can now beat humans at chess and at go. Surely one day they will beat us at proving theorems. But when will it happen, how will it happen, and what should humans be doing in order to make it happen? Furthermore -- do we actually want it to happen? Will they generate incomprehensible proofs, which teach us nothing? Will they find mistakes in the human literature?

I will talk about how I am training undergraduates at Imperial College London to do their problem sheets in a formal proof verification system, and how this gamifies mathematics. I will talk about mistakes in the modern pure mathematics literature, and ask what the point of modern pure mathematics is.

We discuss asymptotics of Toeplitz determinants with Fisher--Hartwig singularities, and give an overview of past and more recent results.
Applications include the study of asymptotics of certain statistics of the characteristic polynomial of the Circular Unitary Ensemble (CUE) of random matrices. In particular recent results in the study of Toeplitz determinants allow for a proof of a conjecture by Fyodorov and Keating on moments of averages of the characteristic polynomial of the CUE.
 

Many complex systems can be represented as networks. However, it is often not possible or even desirable to observe the entire network structure. For example, in social networks, it is often difficult to obtain samples of large networks due to commercial sensitivity or privacy concerns relating to the data. However, it may be possible to provide a coarse grained picture of the graph given knowledge of the distribution of different demographics (e.g age, income, location, etc…) in a population and their propensities for forming ties between each other.

I will explore the degree to which it is possible to influence Ising systems, which are commonly used to model social influence, on unobserved graphs. Using both synthetic networks (stochastic blockmodels) and case studies of real world social networks, I will demonstrate how simple models which rely only on a coarse grained description of the system or knowledge of only the underlying external fields can perform comparably to more expensive optimization algorithms.

I will explore the geometrical structure of Higgs branches of quantum field theories with 8 supercharges in 3, 4, 5 and 6 dimensions. They are hyperkahler singularities, and as such they can be described by a Hasse diagram built from a family of elementary transitions. This corresponds physically to the partial Higgs mechanism. Using brane systems and recently introduced notions of magnetic quivers and quiver subtraction, we formalise the rules to obtain the Hasse diagrams.