Zero-sum stopping games with asymmetric information

We study the value of a zero-sum stopping game in which the terminal payoff function depends on the underlying process and on an additional randomness (with finitely many states) which is known to one player but unknown to the other. Such asymmetry of information arises naturally in insider trading when one of the counterparties knows an announcement before it is publicly released, e.g., central bank's interest rates decision or company earnings/business plans. In the context of game options this splits the pricing problem into the phase before announcement (asymmetric information) and after announcement (full information); the value of the latter exists and forms the terminal payoff of the asymmetric phase.

The above game does not have a value if both players use pure stopping times as the informed player's actions would reveal too much of his excess knowledge. The informed player manages the trade-off between releasing information and stopping optimally employing randomised stopping times. We reformulate the stopping game as a zero-sum game between a stopper (the uninformed player) and a singular controller (the informed player). We prove existence of the value of the latter game for a large class of underlying strong Markov processes including multi-variate diffusions and Feller processes. The main tools are approximations by smooth singular controls and by discrete-time games.