G. Dimitrov and L. Katzarkov introduced in their paper from 2016 the counting of non-commutative curves and their (semi-)stability using T. Bridgeland's stability conditions on triangulated categories. To some degree one could think of this as the non-commutative analog of Gromov-Witten theory. However, its full meaning has not yet been fully discovered. For example there seems to be a relation to proving Markov's conjecture. 

For the talk, I will go over the definitions of stability conditions, non-commutative curves and their counting. After developing some tools relying on working with exceptional collections, I will consider the derived category of representations on the acyclic triangular quiver and will talk about the explicit computation of the invariants for this example.

It is well-known that the Teichmüller space of a compact surface can be identified with a connected component of the moduli space of representations of the fundamental group of the surface in PSL(2,R). Higher Teichmüller components are generalizations of this that exist for the moduli space of representations of the fundamental group into certain real simple Lie groups of higher rank. As for the usual Teichmüller space, these components consist entirely  of discrete and faithful representations. Several cases have been identified over the years. First, the Hitchin components for split groups, then the maximal Toledo invariant components for Hermitian groups, and more recently certain components for SO(p,q). In this talk, I will describe a general construction of (still somewhat conjecturally) all possible Teichmüller components, and a parametrization of them using Higgs bundles.

We  show that homogeneous Einstein metrics on Euclidean spaces are Einstein solvmanifolds, using that they admit periodic, integrally minimal foliations by homogeneous hypersurfaces. For the geometric flow induced by the orbit-Einstein condition, we construct a Lyapunov function based on curvature estimates which come from real GIT.

In this talk, I will introduce the notion of a sheaf on a topological space. I will then explain why "topological spaces" are an artificial limitation on enjoying life (esp. cohomology) to the fullest and what to do about that (answer: sites). Sheaves also fail our needs, but they have a suitable natural upgrade (i.e. stacks).
This talk will be heavily peppered with examples that come from the world around you (music, torsors, etc.).
 

The 2007-2008 financial crisis forced governments to choose between the unattractive alternatives of either bailing out a systemically important bank (SIBs) or having it fail in a disruptive manner. Bail-in has been put forward as the primary tool to resolve a failing bank, which would end the too-big-to-fail problem by letting stakeholders shoulder the losses, while minimising the calamitous systemic impact of a bank failure. Though the aptness of bail-in has been evinced in relatively minor idiosyncratic bank failures, its efficacy in maintaining stability in cases of large bank failures and episodes of system-wide crises remains to be practically tested. This paper investigates the financial stability implications of the bail-in design, in all these cases. We develop a multi-layered network model of the European financial system that captures the prevailing endogenous-amplification mechanisms: exposure loss contagion, overlapping portfolio contagion, funding contagion, bail-inable debt revaluations, and bail-inable debt runs. Our results reveal that financial stability hinges on a set of `primary' and `secondary' bail-in parameters, including the failure threshold, recapitalisation target, debt-to-equity conversion rate, loss absorption requirements, debt exclusions and bail-in-design certainty – and we uncover how. We also demonstrate that the systemic footprint of the bail-in design is not properly understood without the inclusion of multiple contagion mechanisms and non-banks. Our evidence fortunately suggests that the pivot for stability is in the hands of policymakers. It also suggests, however, that the current bail-in design might be in the regime of instability.