In this talk, I will explain a new wall-crossing phenomenon on P^3 that induces non-Q-factorial singularities and thus cannot be understood as an operation in the MMP of the moduli space, unlike the case for many surfaces.  If time permits, I will explain how the wall-crossing could help to understand the geometry of the associated Hilbert scheme and PT moduli space.

A common theme in the definitions of larger large cardinals is the existence of elementary embeddings from the universe into an inner model. In contrast, smaller large cardinals, such as weakly compact and Ramsey cardinals, are usually characterized by their combinatorial properties such as existence of large homogeneous sets for colorings. It turns out that many familiar smaller large cardinals have elegant elementary embedding characterizations. The embeddings here are correspondingly ‘small’; they are between transitive set models of set theory, usually the size of the large cardinal in question. The study of these elementary embeddings has led us to isolate certain important properties via which we have defined robust hierarchies of large cardinals below a measurable cardinal. In this talk, I will introduce these types of elementary embeddings and discuss the large cardinal hierarchies that have come out of the analysis of their properties. The more recent results in this area are a joint work with Philipp Schlicht.

Forcing axioms state that the universe inherits certain properties of generic extensions for a given class of forcings. They are usually formulated via the existence of filters, but several alternative characterisations are known. For instance, Bagaria (2000) characterised some forcing axioms via generic absoluteness for objects of size $\omega_1$. In a related new approach, we consider principles stating the existence of filters that induce correct evaluations of sufficiently simple names in prescribed ways. For example, for the properties ‘nonempty’ or ‘unbounded in $\omega_1$’, consider the principle: whenever this property is forced for a given sufficiently simple name, then there exists a filter inducing an evaluation with the same property. This class of principles turns out to be surprisingly general: we will see how to characterise most known forcing axioms, but also some combinatorial principles that are not known to be equivalent to forcing axioms. This is recent joint work in progress with Christopher Turner.

Leibniz’s principle of identity of indiscernibles at first sight appears completely unrelated to set theory, but Mycielski (1995) formulated a set-theoretic axiom nowadays referred to as LM (for Leibniz-Mycielski) which captures the spirit of Leibniz’s dictum in the following sense:  LM holds in a model M of ZF iff M is elementarily equivalent to a model M* in which there is no pair of indiscernibles.  LM was further investigated in a 2004  paper of mine, which includes a proof that LM is equivalent to the global form of the Kinna-Wagner selection principle in set theory.  On the other hand, one can formulate a strong negation of Leibniz’s principle by first adding a unary predicate I(x) to the usual language of set theory, and then augmenting ZF with a scheme that ensures that I(x) describes a proper class of indiscernibles, thus giving rise to an extension ZFI of ZF that I showed (2005) to be intimately related to Mahlo cardinals of finite order. In this talk I will give an expository account of the above and related results that attest to a lively interaction between set theory and Leibniz’s principle of identity of indiscernibles.

Set theory exhibits a truly robust mutual interpretability phenomenon: in any model of one set theory we can define models of diverse other set theories and vice versa. In any model of ZFC, we can define models of ZFC + GCH and also of ZFC + ¬CH and so on in hundreds of cases. And yet, it turns out, in no instance do these mutual interpretations rise to the level of bi-interpretation. Ali Enayat proved that distinct theories extending ZF are never bi-interpretable, and models of ZF are bi-interpretable only when they are isomorphic. So there is no nontrivial bi-interpretation phenomenon in set theory at the level of ZF or above.  Nevertheless, for natural weaker set theories, we prove, including ZFC- without power set and Zermelo set theory Z, there are nontrivial instances of bi-interpretation. Specifically, there are well-founded models of ZFC- that are bi-interpretable, but not isomorphic—even $\langle H_{\omega_1}, \in \rangle$ and $\langle H_{\omega_2}, \in \rangle$ can be bi-interpretable—and there are distinct bi-interpretable theories extending ZFC-. Similarly, using a construction of Mathias, we prove that every model of ZF is bi-interpretable with a model of Zermelo set theory in which the replacement axiom fails. This is joint work with Alfredo Roque Freire.

Ideas from physics have predicted a number of important properties of random constraint satisfaction problems such as the satisfiability threshold and the free energy (the exponential growth rate of the number of solutions). Another prediction is the condensation regime where most of the solutions are contained in a small number of clusters and the overlap of two random solutions is concentrated on two points. We establish this phenomena in the random regular NAESAT model. Joint work with Danny Nam and Youngtak Sohn.