Ever wondered how ideas from physics can used in real-world scenarios? Come to this talk to understand what is an option and how they are traded in markets. I will recall some basic notions of stochastic calculus and derive the Black-Scholes (BS) equation for plain vanilla options. The BS equation can be solved using standard path integral techniques, that also allow to price more exotic derivatives. Finally, I will discuss whether the assumptions behind Black-Scholes dynamics are reasonable in real-world markets (spoiler: they're not), volatility smiles and term structures of the implied volatility.

Junior Strings is a seminar series where DPhil students present topics of common interest that do not necessarily overlap with their own research area. This is primarily aimed at PhD students and post-docs but everyone is welcome.

A consequence of the works of Costello and Lurie is that the Hochschild chain complex of a Calabi-Yau category admits the structure of a framed E_2 algebra (the genus zero operations). I will describe a new algebraic point of view on these operations which admits generalizations to the setting of relative
Calabi-Yau structures, which do not seem to fit into the framework of TQFTs. In particular, we obtain a generalization of string topology to manifolds with boundary, as well as interesting operations on Hochschild homology of Fano varieties. This is joint work with Chris Brav.

We study a multi-agent setting in which brokers transact with an informed trader. Through a sequential Stackelberg-type game, brokers manage trading costs and adverse selection with an informed trader. In particular, supplying liquidity to the informed traders allows the brokers to speculate based on the flow information. They simultaneously attempt to minimize inventory risk and trading costs with the lit market based on the informed order flow, also known as the internalization-externalization strategy. We solve in closed form for the trading strategy that the informed trader uses with each broker and propose a system of equations which classify the equilibrium strategies of the brokers. By solving these equations numerically we may study the resulting strategies in equilibrium. Finally, we formulate a competitive game between brokers in order to determine the liquidity prices subject to precommitment supplied to the informed trader and provide a numerical example in which the resulting equilibrium is not Pareto efficient.