I will discuss the following papers in my talk:
(1) Protecting consumers from collusive prices due to AI, 2020 with E. Calvano, V. Denicolò, J. Harrington, S.  Pastorello.  Nov 27, 2020, SCIENCE, cover featured article.
(2) Artificial intelligence, algorithmic pricing and collusion, 2020 with E. Calvano, V. Denicolò, S. Pastorello. AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW,  Oct. 2020.
(3) Algorithmic Collusion with Imperfect Monitoring, 2021, with E. Calvano, V. Denicolò, S.  Pastorello

Residual networks (ResNets) have displayed impressive results in pattern recognition and, recently, have garnered considerable theoretical interest due to a perceived link with neural ordinary differential equations (neural ODEs). This link relies on the convergence of network weights to a smooth function as the number of layers increases. We investigate the properties of weights trained by stochastic gradient descent and their scaling with network depth through detailed numerical experiments. We observe the existence of scaling regimes markedly different from those assumed in neural ODE literature. Depending on certain features of the network architecture, such as the smoothness of the activation function, one may obtain an alternative ODE limit, a stochastic differential equation or neither of these. These findings cast doubts on the validity of the neural ODE model as an adequate asymptotic description of deep ResNets and point to an alternative class of differential equations as a better description of the deep network limit.
 

Abstract: We formulate and solve a multi-player stochastic differential game between financial agents who seek to cost-efficiently liquidate their position in a risky asset in the presence of jointly aggregated transient price impact on the risky asset's execution price along with taking into account a common general price predicting signal. In contrast to an interaction of the agents through purely permanent price impact as it is typically considered in the literature on multi-player price impact games, accrued transient price impact does not persist but decays over time. The unique Nash-equilibrium strategies reveal how each agent's liquidation policy adjusts the predictive trading signal for the accumulated transient price distortion induced by all other agents' price impact; and thus unfolds a direct and natural link in equilibrium between the trading signal and the agents' trading activity. We also formulate and solve the corresponding mean field game in the limit of infinitely many agents and show how the latter provides an approximate Nash-equilibrium for the finite-player game. Specifically we prove the convergence of the N-players game optimal strategy to the optimal strategy of the mean field game.     (Joint work with Moritz Voss)